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The palm oil sector in Latin America emerged in the 1930s with investments of private industries. After a 
long period of poor development, the sector has known a new youth in the 1970s with the involvement of 
the States. Public incentives then favored an agro-industrial business model. Since the 1980s it has been 
experiencing a promotion of more growers’ inclusion in the value chain, local development and 
sustainability of production. ‘Strategic alliances’ and ‘social sector’ models emerged as answers to this 
demand. They now represent almost 30% of the regional production. The agro-industrial sector is also 
moving towards a more sustainable production by adopting the RSPO criteria and certification, and by 
developing ‘strategic alliances’, with the support of national public policies. Latin America appears on the 
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The world consumption of oils and fats has been steadily increasing for the lasts thirty years. It grew from 
11 kilograms per person per year in 1976 (Rival and Levang, 2013) to 28 kilos per person per year in 
2016 (Oil World, 2016). As a consequence, oilseed cultivation as soybean, rapeseed and more recently oil 
palm has hugely extended. Since 2010, palm oil has become the main source of vegetable oil worldwide. 
That year, palm oil accounted for 25% of global vegetable oil consumption (Rival and Levang, 2013). In 
2016, the global palm oil production amounted to nearly 60 million tons (representing 34% of global 
vegetable oil production) with an harvested area of about 20 million hectares, making it the oilseed with 
the highest oil yield (with an average world yield of 3.7 T of oil / ha / year, in comparison with soybean, 
0.4 T / ha / year, or rapeseed, 0.7 T / ha / year) (Oil World, 2016). 
Since 2000, oil palm cultivation has hugely extended in Southeast Asia, its main production basin. 
Indonesia and Malaysia, the two main producers, gather almost 89% of the world production (Oil World, 
2016). Latin America and Africa, with respectively 6% and 4% of production, look as small players (Oil 
World, 2016). 
Following its rapid expansion in Asia, oil palm cultivation has raised many environmental (high 
deforestation, biodiversity loss, pollutions…), and social (indigenous land grabbing, unfair partnerships 
between industries and smallholders…) issues and debates. In response to the growing tensions regarding 
oil palm expansion in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian and Malaysian governments edited restrictions on 
plantation possibilities, such as the 2011 Indonesian Moratorium on land available to new oil palm 
plantations (Murdiyarso et al., 2011). On their sides, some of the main palm oil groups engaged with 
NGOs to create the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) which was officially created in 2004 
(RSPO, 2017). However, palm oil groups also followed another strategy: looking for alternative locations 
to expand their plantations, in Africa or Latin America. 
This situation offers a market opportunity for Latin America, which gathers one of the widest suitable 
area for oil palm, with more than 560 Mha only in Brazil, Colombia and Peru (Pirker et al., 2015). Since 
2001, the palm oil sector in Latin America has known a 7% annual growth and has reached a cultivated 
area of almost 1.2 Mha in 2016. The same year, the annual production was estimated to 3.7 MT of crude 
palm oil (USDA, 2017), equivalent to 6% of the world production.  
 
 
Learning from the experience of oil palm development in Southeast Asia, and taking into consideration 
the specificities of Latin America, are sustainable pathways for oil palm development possible in Latin 
America?  
As first steps to answer this question, we conducted in 2017 a preliminary study based on a systematic 
literature review on oil palm history and development in Latin America
1
, and a case study in Costa-Rica.  
 
Advent of oil palm plantations: a banana company at the forefront 
The beginning of oil palm cultivation in Latin America is linked to the history of the United Fruit 
Company (UFCO) a North American company specialized in the production and export of bananas. 
During the twentieth century the company spread over most of the Meso American and 
Caribbean  countries (Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Jamaica, Guatemala, Honduras, Cuba, Nicaragua, 
Santo Domingo), absorbing its competitors, influencing the governments and international trade until it 
became in 1930 the largest employer in Central America. At that time, its capital reached 215 million 
dollars (Les Echos, 2009). 
Besides the banana cultivation, the UFCO launched an experimental station in Honduras (The Botanical 
Garden Lancetilla and Estación Experimental Lancetilla) to study tropical crops potentials. During the 
years it accumulated seeds of nearly a thousand varieties of tropical plants (mainly fruit plants). Among 
them, the botanical garden received oil palm seeds from Indonesia and Malaysia. This is how, between 
1936 and 1938, UFCO established the first oil palm plantation in Central America in San Alejo, 
Honduras. In 1937, seeds were sent to Guatemala and planted in Tiquisate (Washburn, 1987). 
The thirties also marked a difficult period for the UFCO as two diseases affecting banana trees (the 
Panama disease and the Sigatoka) spread on the company’s banana plantations. The banana trees were 
over-treated with copper sulphate, causing a soil pollution harmful to them. The company sought to set up 
an alternative crop, tolerant to a high concentration of copper sulphate in the soil. Oil palm was elected 
thanks to its tolerance to sulphate and the successful first experiments in Guatemala and Honduras.  
                                                          
1
 In 2017, the United State Department of Agriculture recorded 15 palm oil producing countries in Latin America : 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela. We explored literature regarding all of them, and 
looked in more details the main producers. 
 
 
The UFCO then encouraged the expansion of oil palm cultivation in its other divisions, in replacement of 
the previous banana plantations. Consequently, oil palm plantations were developed in Costa Rica (1943), 
Colombia (1945) (Washburn, 1987), Nicaragua (between 1945 and 1950) (IICA, 2006) and Ecuador 
(1952) (Carrion and al., 1985). 
However, the company abandoned most of these experimental plantations in the 1960’s to focus on 
banana cultivation. Only the costarician oil palm plantations were maintained, at the expense of UFCO’s 
banana subsidiary (La Compania Bananera de Costa Rica), which was almost completely converted into 
oil palm plantations (May et al., 1958). 
 
Rise of oil palm plantations: an increasing implication of the States.   
During the same period, Brazil and Mexico governments saw in oil palm plantation an opportunity to 
reach oil sufficiency.  
In Mexico, the government of Chiapas began to encourage oil palm cultivation in the 1950s. However, 
due to the farmers’ reluctance to convert livestock into plantations, oil palm plantations were restricted to 
the region of Soconusco. The expansion will not rebound earlier than in the 1990s, following the sharp 
increase in domestic demand for oils and fat (Mata García, 2014). 
In Brazil, the first oil palm seeds were planted in 1942 by the Ministry of Agriculture in the state of Pará. 
In the 1950s, the Instituto Agronômico do Norte
2
 received oil palm seeds, initiated research on the 
subject, and began distributing seeds and plants across the country. This initiative was reinforced in 1964 
with the establishment of the ‘Planejamento para a Implantação da Cultura do Dendezeiro no Pará’, a 
program in favor of oil palm plantation. Following this plan, the Secretaria de Agricultura do Estado do 
Pará (SAGRI), built a plant associated with 1,000 hectares of oil palm, and launched the plantation of 
2,000 hectares oil palm smallholdings. In 1968 the Secretaria allowed the plantation of 3,000 hectares in 
Mosqueiro (1,500 ha belonging to Denpasa
3
, 1,500 ha belonging to smallholders) (Homma, 2016). 
                                                          
2 Institute of public agronomic research founded by the State (decreto-lei nº 1.245, 1939), it depends on the Centro Nacional de 
Ensino e Pesquisas Agronômicas 
3 Denpasa is a private company owned by the family group OMB Group, whose investors include the Dutch company HVA 
International, the Dutch Development Bank (FMO) and IFC (International Financial Corporation) (Furumo, 2015). 
 
 
These first steps were shortly followed in the 1960’s and 1970’s by an increasing involvement of the 
States in other Latin American countries. Public policies were edited in favor of the sector, lands were 
distributed to farmers willing to start oil palm plantations and national plans were set up to promote and 
support palm oil production. 
In Colombia and Ecuador, producers started to organize themselves and created national associations 
(respectively FEDEPALMA
4
, in 1962 and ANCUPA
5
, in 1970) to promote palm oil production, represent 
the growers’ interests nationally and internationally and organize the dialog within the sector. With the 
creation of these organizations, the oil palm growers have gained more weight in negotiations with the 
governments and have mobilized them in favor of its development. 
In 1967, FEDEPALMA launched a thirty-year strategic plan for the sector’s development called "La 
palma africana en Colombia. El programa para su desarrollo, 1967-1992". It completed the "Plan of 
Fomento de la Palma Africana de Aceite" (decree 290) which was launched by the government in 1957. 
This plan defined enabling public policies: fiscally (financial incentives), commercially (introduction of 
customs duties) and economically (preferential credits), and aimed to promote national palm oil 
production (EmpresasyEconomia.com, 2012). This plan, completed later by the Fondo Financiero 
Agrario (launched in 1966 by the government), was one of the main drivers of oil palm production 
growth in Colombia and led to the funding of more than 20,000 hectares in the 1970s and another 66,000 
hectares in the 1980s. As a result, the Colombian government was the first to join the governments of 
Brazil and Mexico in oil palm promotion. Others followed in the 1970’s: 
In Honduras, the government (through the Instituto Nacional Agrario (INA), the Banco Nacional de 
Fomento and the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales y Otras Dependencia) set up the "Programa de 
colonización y asentamiento campesino en el Valle del Bajo Aguan". This program aimed to distribute 
40,700 ha abandoned by UFCO to 3,000 families of producers, under the Honduran community scheme. 
The project planed the plantation of 6,600 hectares of oil palm. In 1976, INA launched the "Proyecto de 
Palma Africana" to provide technical, administrative and financial assistance to growers (IDB, IICA, and 
Consuplan, 1971). 
                                                          
4 Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite 
5 Asociación Nacional De Cultivadores de Palma Africana 
 
 
In Costa Rica, important peasant movements took place in 1972 and former employees of the banana 
plantations invaded the lands of UFCO to obtain land-tenure rights. Shortly after, the State started a 
compulsory purchase order on land, included UFCO’s land, through the "Instituto de Tierras y 
Colonización" (ITCO). The land was later redistributed to cooperatives that soon after began oil palm 
cultivation (Clare, 2011). 
In Panama, the Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario (MIDA) launched in February 1976 a 
smallholders’ settlement model (defined as ‘asentamientos campesinos’ in the literature). It is a model of 
collective ownership where economic and social activities are conducted by the members of the 
community. Planting and livestock projects were initiated. However, because of their low productivity, 
the government intervened by proposing the establishment of three new crops: banana, cocoa and oil 
palm. 2,216 hectares of oil palm were planted in the province of Chiquiri, shared between two 
cooperatives: COOPEGOTH (1,200 hectares) and Coopemapachi R.L. (Coopemapachi, 2005). 
In Nicaragua, many projects in favor of oil palm also emerged at that time. But the government did not 
interfere until 1988, when the Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Reforma Agraria (MIDINRA) set 
up eight oil palm producers cooperatives. Their production was destined to ‘La Fabrica factory’, 
administered by the Empresa de Desarrollo de Palma Africana y Reforma Agraria (ENDEPARA) which 
was itself state-owned (IICA, 2006). 
Peru also entered the oil palm sector in the 1970’s. The government, through its company "Empresa para 
el Desarrollo y Explotacion de la Palma Aceitera Sociedad Anonima" (EMDEPALMA SA), developed 
the first oil palm plantations in the department of San Martin (Tocache province) (Deustua Borasino, 
2016). 
Finally, in Ecuador, the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización
6
 (IERAC) granted, in 
1979, 20,000 hectares to the companies Palmeras del Ecuador and Palmoriente (10,000 hectares each) to 
plant oil palm. Half of it was planted after 1985 with oil palm. From this period, the oil palm sector 
continued on a rapid growth (on average 7% per year), favored by an expanding domestic market and 
protective policies regarding domestic supply for agricultural products and other raw materials (Carrion 
et al., 1985). During the 1990s and 2000s planted areas continued to expand mainly through private 
enterprise initiatives (GRAIN, 2014). 
                                                          
6 The IERAC was created by the Junta Militar de Gobierno as part of the Ley de Tierras Baldias y Colonizacion (28.09.1964) 
 
 
A major role of industries in the rise of palm oil production.  
Thanks to these public incentives, the sector has known in the 1980’s and 1990’s a major development 
carried by private groups in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala and Peru. 
In Brazil, the public fundings declined during the 1980s and were replaced by private investment. 
Agropalma
7
, a Brazilian private company founded in 1981, planted 5,000 hectares of oil palm. Many 
companies and factories were created and started to associate with Agropalma to form a conglomerate 
specialized in oil palm cultivation and palm oil production. Other Brazilian companies such as 
Agroindustrial Palmasa S.A., Biopalma, ADM, followed the example over the following decades and 
began investing in the sector (Homma, 2016). 
At the same time, the first oil palm plantations appeared in the Dominican Republic, they were privately 
owned by Grupo Sid and INASCA S.R.L, two domestic companies. 
In Guatemala, since the early 1990s private companies have successively started converting their land, 
previously used for cattle, banana cultivation or other agricultural activities, into oil palm plantations. 
Between 2000 and 2012, the cultivated area has hugely extended, with an annual growth of 10 000ha. 
Consequently the planted area was multiplied by 10 and the incomes from oil palm cultivation were 
multiplied by 20 during this period (Guereňa et al., 2013). Today, eight Guatemalan families, divided 
into 40 private companies, own 98% of the national palm oil sector, among them, the principal companies 




 and the group AGROAMÉRICA
10
. At the end of the 
1990s, Honduras has also known a massive expansion of the sector with the beginning of large agro-
industrial plantations belonging to private companies as Grupo JAREMAR, Corporación DINANT, 
ACEYDESA, and PALCASA. The yearly sector’s growth was then estimated to more than 7%. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, foreign investments have emerged in some Latin American countries. The 
government of Malaysia has expressed its interest in Venezuela and Peru, but without any materialization 
of plans so far. Chinese (China Zong Heng Tai) and Indian (Food Fertilizer & Fat (FFF)) groups also 
                                                          
7 Agropalma is a subsidiary of Alfa Group, a conglomerate belonging to the Brazilian billionaire Aloysio de Andrade Faria and 
which has subsidiaries in several sectors (banking, construction, communication ...) (Brandao, 2015) 
8  Grupo Hame, owned by the Molina Espinoza and Molina Botrán families, was then one of Guatemala's leading cotton 
producers and owned an OLMECA oil extraction plant 
9 A Guatemalan family business, it merged in 2002 with Grasas y Aceites to form the Naturaceites group  
10 Multinational belonging to the Bolaños Valle family, specializing in the production of tropical fruits and vegetable oils 
 
 
initiated negotiations with the Surinamese government. In Nicaragua, Guatemalan companies have 
revitalized the sector by investing nearly $ 120 million. The sector has since grown exponentially
11
 
(PRONicaragua, 2017, El 19 Digital, 2017). In 2007, a new player appeared in the Peruvian palm oil 
sector when the North American investor Denis Melka
12
 took the initiative to buy over 10,000 hectares of 
farmland to plant oil palm (Deustua Borasino, 2016). 
Table 1 : Importance of the private companies in the national palm oil sectors 
The private companies’ capitals are predominantly domestic but there is also a strong presence of regional 
capital (Colombian, Guatemalan and Costa Rican) in Central America and of North American capital 
throughout the continent. 
Until 2000, the sector was mainly organized under an agro-industrial model: units of large-scale 
plantations around extraction plants (and sometimes refineries) belonging to the same company. This 
model is still the most frequent in Latin America and represents almost 70% of the regional production 
(Table 1). It results from the multiplication of private investments in the sector, with domestic or 
                                                          
11 This was allowed by the "Ley 344: Ley de Promocion de inversiones extranjeras" guaranteeing foreign capital companies the 
same commercial rights as domestic companies, in addition to various financial incentives such as the exemption from taxes and 
VAT for the first ten years of activity (Vianica, 2013). 
12 Grupo Melka is a group of 25 companies in the oil palm and cocoa sectors, which also has subsidiaries in Malaysia. 
Country 
% of the planted area cultivated 
by private companies 
% of the national palm oil 
produced by the private companies 
Brazil 75% 90% 
Colombia - 69% 
Costa Rica 30% 80% 
Ecuador - 60% 
Guatemala 85% 98% 
Honduras 27% 29% 
Mexico - 30% 
Nicaragua 80% - 
Peru 45% 57% 
Dominican Republic 100% 100% 
Venezuela 18% 89% 
 
 
international capital. Its development has been strongly supported and encouraged by governments 
through land distributions, establishment of national plans or financial incentives. 
This model consists in companies with a high level of vertical integration, meaning that these companies 
both have plantations, an extraction plant, and a refinery. The largest groups are organized into several 
agro-industrial complexes, each with their own plantations and processing units. They cover the entire 
production chain. Thanks to their high capital and good access to new technologies, their expansion is 
rapid and widespread on high-yielding agro-industrial plantations (Gutierrez-Velez, 2011). 
 
The rise of original business models 
In the 1980’s, as governments started to promote social inclusion and territorial development, some 
private companies initiated partnerships with independent growers and a new business model appeared: 
the “strategic alliances”13. This model is based on relationships and arrangements between mills and 
growers, and aims at improving the integration of smallholders and the regular supply of large companies.  
A sales agreement is signed between the growers and the company which owns the extraction plant (mill): 
the company provides seeds, technical and financial assistance and sometimes carries social programs in 
exchange of exclusivity on the purchase of fresh fruit bunches. These contracts ensure the growers of an 
easy sale of their production, the guarantee of a better access to technology (tools, genetic material, etc...), 
which should lead to better yields. It also motivates them to organize themselves in professional 
organizations such as cooperatives, to gain economies of scale and power of negotiation. Companies also 
benefit from the partnership through the insurance of a regular supply without enlarging their plantations 
(FEDEPALMA, 2010).  
The main difference between the strategic alliances and the Nucleus Estates and Smallholders (NES) 
model, very common in Southeast Asia and West-Central Africa (Feintrenie et al., 2010, Nkongho et al., 
2014), lies in the organization of the producers under contract. In the strategic alliances, growers are 
gathered under private business associations; they share a binding commitment in the association’s 
contract with the mill, and own their plantation’s land (De la Rosa, 2012). On the opposite, the NES 
                                                          
13  “Strategic alliances” (or “alianzas estrategicas” in Spanish) is the term mainly used to qualify this model in the literature and 
for most of the countries. However it was not used in Costa Rica as the growers under contract with the companies (private and 
social) are called under the term “Productores independientes” (independent producers). The independent producers as defined in 
the literature are called “productores particulares” (individual producers). 
 
 
model involves contracts between an enterprise owning an extraction plant (and most often a plantation) 
and individual growers organized in cooperatives. The industrial plantation belong to the plant and is the 
center of the cultivated area (Nucleus Estate), the smallholders’ plantations surround them. Growers 
signed individual contracts with the enterprise and the cooperatives managed their plantations following 
the technical guidance of the enterprise (Feintrenie et al., 2010). 
In the 2000s, with the launch of the MIDAS program
14
 by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in Colombia, many new strategic alliances appeared (USAID, 2016) increasing 
the importance of this business-model in the national sector. Today, it is particularly important in 
Colombia, where it represents 30 % of the cultivated area and 15% of the growers (FEDEPALMA, 2010). 
Table 2 : Importance of the strategic alliances in the national palm oil sectors 
The model of the strategic alliances was later adopted in other countries as Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico and Peru, where private companies started to engage themselves with smallholders 
through sales agreement and offered the same services as observed in Colombia. The importance given to 
the strategic alliances in the previous countries is summarized in Table 2. In Brazil, this model was 
duplicated in 2005, when the national plan for biodiesel “Programa de Produção e Uso do Biodiesel: 
Marco Regulatório e Metas Físicas” (PNPB) was launched with the “Social Fuel Seal” (SFS) program. 
The SFS offers incentives and tax-benefits to the agro-industries buying their raw material to smallholders 
                                                          
14 The MIDAS program (Más Inversión para el Desarrollo Sostenible) aimed to generate and reinforce sustainable profits of the 
private sector, while guaranteeing an economical growth and the competitiveness of the sector. 
 
Number of growers 
involved in strategic 
alliances 
% of the national palm oil 
production produced by the 
strategic alliances' model 
% of the planted area 
belonging to the strategic 
alliances' model 
Brazil 900 8 17,3 
Colombia 4200 31 30 
Costa Rica around 1500 20 20 
Ecuador - - - 
Guatemala 200 <2% 11 
Mexico - - - 
Peru - - - 
 
 
and offering them technical assistance, training and specific incomes (Federal Law 11,116, 2005) 
(Rodrigues et al., 2007).  
 
Another business model appeared in the 1980’s, defined as the “social sector” in the literature (SHARP, 
n.d. and the Article 25 of the ‘Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos’). This social 
model is based on a system of association between growers and factories. The extraction plant and, if 
applicable, the refineries, partly or fully, belong to the growers and groups of growers (associations or 
cooperatives) who supply it and who are therefore shareholders. The results of the exercise (losses or 
profits) are distributed between the members in proportion to their initial contributions. Growers receive 
the profits from the sale of their FFB as well as a percentage of the profit made on the sale of finished 
products. 
As for the private ones and in addition to the shareholders, the "social companies" get partly their supply 
from independent or contracted growers, providing the same type of guarantees as those offered by the 
private sector. In the end of the 1990s, with the increase of the national demand for oils and fats, the 
federal government of Mexico launched the "Programa Nacional de la Palma” to galvanize the national 
palm oil production. Most of the plantations that were initiated with this plan belong to the social sector. 
According to the "Plan nacional del sistema producto palma de aceite 2004-2014" (SAGARPA, 2004), 
this business model counts 96% of the growers participate and generates 70% of the national production. 
Gonzalez Rodriguez (nd) reported that four of the 17 factories belong to the social sector.  
The main examples of social sector enterprises in Honduras are COAPALMA, composed by 14 
cooperatives (owning 5,000 hectares) and 80 independent growers and HONDUPALMA composed of 30 
cooperatives (La Prensa, 2013). The sector has a total of 3 extraction plants and 2 refineries. In 2011, 
Rivera Rodriguez et al., estimated the importance of HONDUPALMA in the national sector at 12%.  
In these two countries, the model of the “social sector” does not seem to be limited to oil palm cultivation 
but to characterize a typical operating model of these countries.  
Similar models were launched in the 1990’s in Peru with the support of the USAID and the government 
to replace coca cultivation by oil palm smallholders’ plantations, to create growers’ associations involved 
in the whole oil palm sector (production, extraction and refinery) and promote local development in rural 
 
 
areas. According to Junpalma (2014), the social sector represents 23,000 hectares divided among nearly 
3,500 growers. The factories of the social sector are INDULPASA, OLPESA, OLAMSA and OLPASA. 
Their financial capitals are shared between growers, private groups and individual investors (which does 
not seem to be the case in other countries). They represent 30% of the national production.  
In Costa Rica, another example based on the same principle exists, even though it is not named ‘social 
model’ in the literature. Indeed, in 1987, with the aim to limit private companies’ monopole over the 
sector, the state launched the « Proyecto Agroindustrial de Coto Sur », defined in the Ley de la Republica 
N°7062 (26/03/1987), and projected the construction of an agro-industrial cooperative. The project was 
financed by the government, the Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) and the Conmonwealh 
Development Corporation (Clare, 2011). Due to farmers’ reluctance towards government policies, the 
cooperative Cooperativa Agroindustrial de Productores de Palma Aceitera Responsabilidad Limitada 
(Coopeagropal R.L.) was created only in 1993 and its extraction plant started to operate in 1995. Today, 
Coopeagropal represents 15,000 ha (divided between the cooperative, the 630 shareholders and the 
independent producers) equivalent to 25 % of the national planted area, and gather 20% of the national 
palm oil production. In Costa Rica, all the growers (individually or in cooperatives) are invited to be 
shareholders of the cooperative Coopeagropal (field survey, 2017). 
Finally, it also appears that the extraction plant in Barú (Panama), is shared between three cooperatives of 
growers (Copal, Coopemapachi and Coopegoth) and belongs to this model. In Nicaragua, growers’ 
cooperatives tried to reproduce this model and created the “Unión de Cooperativas Palmeras, R. L” 
(UCOPA, R. L.). However, because of the low production and the fall of the international prices, it was 
rapidly dissolved (IICA, 2006). The importance of the social model varies among the countries and is 









Number of producers 
involved in the social 
sector 
% of the national palm oil 
production produced by 
the social sector's model 
% of the planted area 




630 <20 21 
Honduras - 12 - 
Mexico 96% of the producers 70 - 
Panama - - - 
Peru 3500 30 30 
Table 3 : Importance of the ‘social sector’ in the national palm oil sectors 
 
The ‘social sector’ model appears to be characteristic and original of the Latin American sector, but has 
some similarities with initiatives led by NGOs in Africa and Asia to develop smallholder’s palm oil 
production independently of large groups’ factories.  
These three business models, the agro-industrial model, the strategic alliances and the social sector, are 
characterized by an unequal share of economic benefits and risks, and power of decision between actors. 
 
What challenges to reach sustainability? 
Reports of negative impacts of oil palm plantations 
With the rapid expansion of oil palm plantations, controversies aroused regarding socio-economical and 
environmental impacts observed in the region. Furumo et al. (2017) estimated that the sector has known a 
massive expansion between 2001 and 2014, with an annual production growth of 7% and an annual 
expansion of the cultivated area estimated at 9%. This growth, partly related to government incentives 
and the private groups’ expansion, can also be explained by the economic appeal it represents for small 
producers: it represents a long-term investment, providing them with a steady income throughout the 
plantation's operation, despite it is a fluctuant income (directly related to fluctuations in the price of oil).  
 
 
The Costa Rican producers interviewed quoted, for example, harvesting and selling bunches once a week, 
leading to weekly revenue. Most of them admit having been motivated by the prospect of regular income, 
which they did not have with other crops or livestock. In Costa Rica, that increase in the incomes 
translates into an improvement in the quality of life of the inhabitants of the region at the individual and 
collective levels: the region has seen a multiplication of individual possessions as means of transport, as 
well as a noticeable improvement in the services in the villages (maintenance of the roads, creation of 
new schools and colleges, health posts and small businesses). 
The sector also presents a strong demand for labor, with more than 600,000 direct jobs (in plantations or 
factories, companies, etc.) and indirect jobs (transporters, etc.) generated in Latin America
15
 , which are 
mainly located in the palm oil production basins. In Costa Rica this results in improvements in the 
production basins areas as mentioned above. Similar phenomenon are observed in Colombia, where the 
various companies have launched social services policies (health, education) and partnerships between the 
independent producers, the companies and its employees. These policies aimed to better integrate actors 
and improve relations in rural areas (Gomez et al., 2005). The same goes for the DANEC Group in 
Ecuador. The available literature does not enable to highlight similar impacts in the other countries of 
study. 
 The dynamic of expansion of the sector is reflected in a strong land conversion phenomenon in Costa 
Rica and Latin America. Furumo et al. (2017) conducted satellite image tracking to determine land 
evolution in Latin America. The study shows that 79% of new oil palm plantations were developed on 
previously deforested land and haven’t caused direct deforestation. It appears that the expansion of the oil 
palm mainly occurred as a replacement of other forms of agriculture: livestock or traditional food crops 
(rice, beans, corn). The literature gives to this conversion some positive impacts as the recovery of 
degraded areas, a better carbon sequestration than other crops or a better forest cover (Droulers, et al., 
2010). Negative impacts are also quoted especially the impact on food security in absence of food crops 
in the area (Potter, 2015), the decrease of available food in family farms: the food that was previously 
produced within the family, must now be purchased (Guerena et al., 2013). 
It also appears that deforestation is the second land-use transition caused by oil palm expansion in Latin 
America. It is mainly (80%) located in South America, particularly in Peru, Brazil and Ecuador. In the 
scientific literature (Dammert, 2014; Furumo, 2017) and the media, Peru appears as the most affected by 
                                                          
15 Estimation from available data in the literature for Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and Guatemala. 
 
 
this deforestation, as a result of private groups’ expansion and the lack of coordination between the 
Ministries of Agriculture (MINAGRI) and of the Environment (MINAM) concerning oil palm expansion 
areas. In fact, there is a legal way to convert primary forests into plantations: if deforestation occurs on 
agricultural purposes, it is governed by the ‘Leyes de Tierra y Agricultura’ of the MINAGRI and no 
longer by the ‘Ley Forestal and Fauna Silvestre’ of the MINAM. These forests can then be legally 
deforested as it is seen as an expansion of agriculture (USDA, 2016). Consequently, between 2000 and 
2010, 70% of oil palm expansion occurred in formerly forested areas (ie 1% of the country's 
deforestation) (Gutierrez-Velez, 2011). In Central America, Guatemala gather 93% of the deforestation 
caused by oil palm expansion (Furumo et al., 2017). 
Among the consequences of this deforestation, the most recurrent in the literature are the pollution of 
water and soil resources and the loss of biodiversity. Deforestation leads to a strong erosion phenomenon 
that results in the transport of sediments and phytosanitary products into the rivers and, eventually, into 
the sea. In addition, the discharge of plant effluents and waters from oxidation lagoons of the extraction 
plants also cause a pollution of the soil and water next to it. Numerous examples of environmental 
impacts can be cited in Ecuador (Ramos, 2008, Buitrón, 2001) or Guatemala (CMI Guatemala, 2015), 
where, in June 2015, after heavy rains, nearly a thousand fishes were found dead in the waters of the river 
La Pasión. The link was made between this ecocide and the leaching of pesticides used in neighboring oil 
palm plantations (exploited by RESPA, a Grupo Hame company) (CMI Guatemala, 2015). In Honduras 
the waters polluted by the plantations of the Atlantida department flow into the Atlantic Ocean and affect 
the "Mesamerican Reef", the second largest coral reef in the world (The Violence of Development, 2015). 
Beyond the environmental impacts (loss of river and marine biodiversity, risk for other non-marine 
species, water and soil pollution, etc.), this phenomenon has led to economic and social impacts on the 
surrounding communities. Indeed, local populations use the rivers for both economic (fishing, watering 
animals) and social (women go with children to swim, play, etc.) activities that are now impossible 
because of the pollution (CMI Guatemala, 2015). 
Also social conflicts have emerged, particularly as a result of land grabbing by large groups to plant oil 
palm, also causing land concentration. Two grabbing dynamics apply. The first example is the purchase 
of land from producers by the group to increase the group’s supply basins. Many violence and threats to 
reluctant producers have been reported in Colombia and Honduras, where Mingorance (2006), Ballvé 
(2009) and the NGO Salva la Selva (2014) denounced the presence of paramilitaries in and near private 
groups’ plantations. In Guatemala, if producers with landlocked parcels want to cross the companies’ 
 
 
plantations, they must request permission one week in advance and charge fees apply. These various 
measures have pushed many smallholders to sell their lands to large groups. The second type of land 
grabbing results in the non-recognition by governments of indigenous lands. These lands have either been 
distributed by the state or directly grabbed by private groups. This has caused many land conflicts with 
indigenous communities, forcing some of them to migrate to other regions or cities (Droulers, et al., 
2010, GRAIN, 2014). 
 
A move towards more sustainability 
In answer to the critics, most of the countries and the actors have changed their production policies. In 
Colombia and Brazil, for example, laws have been emitted in favor of social inclusion of the planters (tax 
benefits are given to plants whom suppliers are smallholders) and consequently the number of strategic 
alliances has rapidly grown. Numerous programs and actions were also launched to limit socio-
economical and environmental impacts linked to oil palm expansion.  
In Brazil, for example, the State launched in 2010, the program of sustainable oil palm production 
"Programa Produção Sustentável de Palma de Óleo no Brasil" (SPOPP). Its objective is to supervise the 
development of oil palm cultivation in order to preserve forests. In parallel, an agroecological zonification 
map (ZAE Palma) has been produced in order to establish a geographical limitation for oil palm 
plantations. The SPOPP set up new regulations and penalties on planted areas: oil palm is authorized on 
deforested areas before 2007 and already used by humans. Its development is particularly favored on 
degraded areas and is prohibited on native vegetation areas or areas belonging to indigenous lands. 
INPE
16
 analyzes satellite images to verify that the ZAE is respected and to monitor areas of oil palm 
expansion (Homma, 2016). The BNDES (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento)
17
 is authorized to issue 
advantageous loans on degraded areas to promote the development of the oil palm. It is not allowed to 
give these credits on non-degraded areas (Englund, et al., 2015). 
In Ecuador, an environmental regulation was put in place by the Acurdo No 015 of Ministry of the 
Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente) in February 2012. Depending on their production area, producers 
must submit an environmental license (> 100 ha), an environmental declaration (50 to 100ha) or 
                                                          
16 INPES : Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais 
17 Brazilian Bank of Investments. Federal company associated to the Ministry of Development, Industry and commerce of Brazil 
 
 
environmental records (<75ha) issued by the Ministry of the Environment, which are supposed to 
guarantee the sustainability of plantations (FEDAPAL, 2017). 
In Costa Rica, a collaboration was established between Canapalma
18
 and the MINAE
19
 and aimed at 
establishing good agricultural practices for the oil palm cultivation. In addition, when a producer wants to 
initiate a new plantation, he is subject to a visit of the Ministry of the Environment which controls the 
lands to be planted, their deforestation since 2005 (under RSPO standards), the presence of protected 
areas or remarkable species, the presence of a nearby watercourse, etc ... Until the planting project is not 
validated by the MINAE the grower cannot initiate the plantation. 
 
RSPO enters the game 
Moreover, with the world’s concern for a sustainable palm oil production and its impacts in South-East 
Asia, most of the private agro-industries are now willing to obtain the RSPO (Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil) certification to secure their supply and reassure their clients and the final consumers (RSPO, 
2017). Its objective is to promote the growth and sustainability of the sector by promoting the 
implementation of sustainability principles. In 2005, the RSPO set up a certification panel for the entire 
value chain, which aims at ensuring a low impact of the sector on the environment including biodiversity, 
as well as a respect for local populations. This certification requires legal, economic, environmental and 
social good practices. It has well spread in Latin America, reaching 285 000 ha of certified plantations 
(23% of the regional planted area) and 697 900 MT of Certified Sustainable Palm Oil (19 % of the 
regional CPO production) in 2017, making Latin America the region with the major potential for 
sustainable production (Naranjo, 2015).  
As required by the RSPO, some Latin countries have validated national interpretations of the RSPO 
principles and criteria. Honduras was the first country to conduct this national interpretation (validated in 
2013) and incorporated certification in the requirements of its "social enterprises". Other countries also 
have validated the national requirements but not all have adapted it to the local business models: 
Colombia, Ecuador (2010), Guatemala and Peru (2013). 
                                                          
18 CANAPALMA (Camara Nacional de Productores de Palma) is the national syndicate of oil palm producers in Costa Rica 
19  MINAE (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía) is the ministery of environment and Energy of Costa Rica 
 
 
Costa-Rica is a good example of this ambition of both private and public actors of the palm oil sector to 
move towards a sustainable production, and it ranked 4th in the quantity of Certified Palm Oil Produced 
(CSPO) with 159 804 of Certified Palm Oil (CSPO) produced (58.8% of the national production), 
reaching the highest certification rate in Latin America (RSPO, 2017).  
Palma Tica (a Costa Rican private company belonging to the agro-industrial model) is currently the only 
certified planter: the company became a member in 2012, and received certification for all of its 
plantations in 2015. Coopeagropal (model of the ‘social sector’) is still in the process of being certified. 
Today, most producers are strongly encouraged by both companies to adopt the RSPO standards and 
companies put in place measures to help them (technical assistance, funding necessary for certification, 
etc.). The two companies, with the aim of generalizing the certification, to their plantations and also to the 
contracted producers (under the strategic alliances model) provide trainings in order to sensitize them and 
the agricultural employees to the good agricultural practices to adopt, from environmental (recycling, 
phytosanitary treatment) to sanitary measures (wearing of Personal Protective Equipment). The RSPO 
certification also has a social aspect, securing employment (with the obligation to pay the "Seguro de 
Riesgos de Trabajo" 
20
, ensuring a minimum wage, or prohibition of child labor) . 
The companies also offers a financial motivation towards the adoption of RSPO by offering better prices 
for certified production ($ 2.5 / ton of bunches instead of 1.5$). Today the non-certified producers have 
difficulties to sell their production to the companies, pushing them to move towards the certification 
process. 
A similar action was observed in Honduras with the establishment of the " Plan de Divulgacion de las 
Acciones del Sector Palmero en el Marco de la Certificacion RSPO " whose purpose was to inform the 
actors on the importance of the RSPO certification. It has been highly promoted by companies and 
producers. Today the country is showing a desire to adhere to the RSPO standards, which appears to be 
the best way to be competitive and to open up to international markets by ensuring the sale of their 
products (FHIA Hn , 2017). Companies in the sector provide training and technical assistance to growers 
to obtain certification. This allows them to increase productivity, incomes and lower production costs 
(FHIA Hn, 2017). 
                                                          
20 Mandatory work insurance for the employees that guarantee medical care in case of accident or disease. 
 
 
However, despite these efforts and the strong emphasis placed on RSPO certification in the region, some 
abusive oil palm expansions tarnish regional investments, and controversies have recently followed 
negative social and environmental impacts due for example to the high deforestation (among others by the 
Grupo Melka in Peru (USDA, 2016)), the pollution of natural resources (in Guatemala (CMI Guatemala, 
2015) or in Ecuador (Ramos, 2008; Buitrón, 2001)) or the expulsion of indigenous populations out of 
their territory (mainly in Ecuador or Colombia, (GRAIN, 2014)). Thus, despite the vigilance reigning on 
oil palm development in America, the sector seems to face the same issues as Southeast Asia although it 
appears to be globally more controlled and more virtuous. 
Today, the literature does not offer a satisfying crossover critic on the business models’ repercussion on 
local population or the environment. Today the agro-industrial model is the main target of criticism and 
complaints and the large-scale expansion of private groups is pointed out in deforestation, land grabbing 
or water pollution issues. However the literature also testifies of its implication in rural and social 
development. The social models (the social alliances and the ‘social sector’) have been less criticized in 
the literature so far, but comparison studies between the business models are lacking to estimate their 
relative socio-economic and environmental impacts. 
 
Conclusion 
After several decades of a slow development in Latin America, the palm oil sector has experienced since 
2001 a rapid growth, which has successively affected a large majority of the tropical countries of Latin 
America. However, an unequal importance is accorded nationally to the palm oil sector depending on the 
historical involvement of the various actors and especially of the governments. The Brazilian and 
Mexican governments, in the 1960s and 2000s, Colombian, since the 1960s, or Honduran in the 1970s 
were particularly involved in development and promotion of the sector. Such public support have raised 
the interest of private companies which quickly became a main actor and driving force of development in 
the region.  
Today three business models characterize the American sector: the agro-industrial sector, the "social" 
sector, and the "strategic alliances". The last two are dominant in Mexico and Honduras, and favor the 
social aspect of production, with the aim of turning oil palm production into a driver of social integration 
and territorial development.  
 
 
The agro-industrial model, dominant in Brazil, Guatemala and Costa Rica, priorities profitability and 
profit. However, it has been recently moving towards sustainable production, in relation with the creation 
of the RSPO in 2004.  
Also, following the awareness of oil palm problems in Asia, a special attention has been paid to the 
environmental aspect and many measures have been taken by the governments to ensure preservation of 
the environment and to limit deforestation in Latin America. This awareness has resulted in the 
establishment of more sustainable national public policies, seeking to achieve territorial cohesion and to 
ensure a development that is respectful of the environment and of the local populations. Governmental 
policies have evolved from expansion policies to management policies (in particular in Brazil). The sector 
is moving towards more sustainability in production or at least shows a strong desire to develop in this 
direction. All the actors are involved in this process and will play their part in the future of the sector: 
governments (through the implementation of public policies that encourage and oversee the development 
of the sector), agro-industries (through the adoption practices respectful of the environment and the 
integration of individual planters), growers (whether from an individual point of view by adopting good 
agricultural practices or collectively by organizing themselves to allow a better integration of the sector), 
and final consumers.  
This is a preliminary study based on literature. Deeper analyses of case studies are needed to move 
forward to context-specific recommendations. 
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